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Protection against pathalogical DNSSEC domains. 

An attacker can create DNSSEC signed domains which need a lot of
work to verfify. We limit the number of crypto operations to
avoid DoS attacks by CPU exhaustion.

Signed-off-by: DL6ER <dl6er@dl6er.de>
This commit is contained in:
Simon Kelley 2023-12-30 21:01:05 +00:00 committed by DL6ER
parent 91b924d269
commit 108ab67dc9
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 00135ACBD90B28DD
2 changed files with 93 additions and 33 deletions
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95
src/dnsmasq/dnssec.c
View File

@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of wildcard expansion.
(In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard within name.)
STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet.
STAT_ABANDONED validation abandoned do to excess resource usage.
STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
@ -447,7 +448,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
int algo_in, int keytag_in, unsigned long *ttl_out)
{
unsigned char *p;
int rdlen, j, name_labels, algo, labels, key_tag;
int rdlen, j, name_labels, algo, labels, key_tag, sig_fail_cnt;
struct crec *crecp = NULL;
short *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
u32 sig_expiration, sig_inception;
@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
rrsetidx = sort_rrset(header, plen, rr_desc, rrsetidx, rrset, daemon->workspacename, keyname);
/* Now try all the sigs to try and find one which validates */
for (j = 0; j <sigidx; j++)
for (sig_fail_cnt = 0, j = 0; j <sigidx; j++)
{
unsigned char *psav, *sig, *digest;
int i, wire_len, sig_len;
@ -664,9 +665,22 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
for (; crecp; crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now, F_DNSKEY))
if (crecp->addr.key.algo == algo &&
crecp->addr.key.keytag == key_tag &&
crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
verify(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
return (labels < name_labels) ? STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD : STAT_SECURE;
crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
{
if (verify(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
return (labels < name_labels) ? STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD : STAT_SECURE;
/* An attacker can waste a lot of our CPU by setting up a giant DNSKEY RRSET full of failing
keys, all of which we have to try. Since many failing keys is not likely for
a legitimate domain, set a limit on how many can fail. */
sig_fail_cnt++;
if (sig_fail_cnt > 10) /* TODO */
{
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, "sig_fail_cnt");
return STAT_ABANDONED;
}
}
}
}
@ -681,6 +695,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
STAT_OK Done, key(s) in cache.
STAT_BOGUS No DNSKEYs found, which can be validated with DS,
or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid, bad packet.
STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion.
STAT_NEED_DS DS records to validate a key not found, name in keyname
STAT_NEED_KEY DNSKEY records to validate a key not found, name in keyname
*/
@ -688,7 +703,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
{
unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
struct crec *crecp, *recp1;
int rc, j, qtype, qclass, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag;
int rc, j, qtype, qclass, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag, ds_fail_cnt, key_fail_cnt;
unsigned long ttl, sig_ttl;
struct blockdata *key;
union all_addr a;
@ -713,7 +728,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
}
/* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j--)
for (key_fail_cnt = 0, valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j--)
{
/* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
@ -762,7 +777,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if (!key)
continue;
for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1, name, now, F_DS))
for (ds_fail_cnt = 0, recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1, name, now, F_DS))
{
void *ctx;
unsigned char *digest, *ds_digest;
@ -771,7 +786,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
int wire_len;
if (recp1->addr.ds.algo == algo &&
recp1->addr.ds.keytag == keytag &&
recp1->addr.ds.keytag == keytag &&
recp1->uid == (unsigned int)class)
{
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
@ -796,30 +811,54 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if (!(recp1->flags & F_NEG) &&
recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size &&
(ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1->addr.ds.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)) &&
memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen) == 0 &&
explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) &&
rrcnt != 0)
(ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1->addr.ds.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)))
{
if (sigcnt == 0)
continue;
else
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname,
NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag, &sig_ttl);
failflags &= rc;
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
if (memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen) != 0)
{
valid = 1;
break;
/* limit CPU exhaustion attack from large DS x KEY cross-product. */
ds_fail_cnt++;
if (ds_fail_cnt > 5) /* TODO */
{
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, "ds_fail_cnt");
return STAT_ABANDONED;
}
}
else if (explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) &&
rrcnt != 0)
{
if (sigcnt == 0)
continue;
else
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname,
NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag, &sig_ttl);
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_ABANDONED))
return STAT_ABANDONED;
failflags &= rc;
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
{
valid = 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
blockdata_free(key);
/* limit CPU exhaustion attack from large DS x KEY cross-product. */
key_fail_cnt++;
if (key_fail_cnt > 15) /* TODO */
{
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, "key_fail_cnt");
return STAT_ABANDONED;
}
}
if (valid)
@ -916,6 +955,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
STAT_BOGUS no DS in reply or not signed, fails validation, bad packet.
STAT_NEED_KEY DNSKEY records to validate a DS not found, name in keyname
STAT_NEED_DS DS record needed.
STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion.
*/
int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
@ -1798,6 +1838,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t now)
STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet, no validation where there should be.
STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname, class in *class)
STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion.
daemon->rr_status points to a char array which corressponds to the RRs in the
answer and auth sections. This is set to >1 for each RR which is validated, and 0 for any which aren't.
@ -1984,7 +2025,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1, sigcnt,
rrcnt, name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0, &sig_ttl);
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS))
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_ABANDONED))
{
if (class)
*class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */

31
src/dnsmasq/forward.c
View File

@ -974,11 +974,15 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class,
!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_IGN_NS) && (forward->sentto->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC),
NULL, NULL, NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_BOGUS))
dump_packet_udp((forward->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY)) ? DUMP_SEC_BOGUS : DUMP_BOGUS,
header, (size_t)plen, &forward->sentto->addr, NULL, -daemon->port);
#endif
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_ABANDONED))
{
/* Log the actual validation that made us barf. */
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->namebuff, 0, 4) == 1)
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("validation of %s failed: resource limit exceeded."),
daemon->namebuff[0] ? daemon->namebuff : ".");
}
}
/* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put this
@ -1109,6 +1113,12 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
status = STAT_ABANDONED;
}
#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_ABANDONED))
dump_packet_udp((forward->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY)) ? DUMP_SEC_BOGUS : DUMP_BOGUS,
header, (size_t)plen, &forward->sentto->addr, NULL, -daemon->port);
#endif
/* Validated original answer, all done. */
if (!forward->dependent)
return_reply(now, forward, header, plen, status);
@ -1117,7 +1127,7 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
/* validated subsidiary query/queries, (and cached result)
pop that and return to the previous query/queries we were working on. */
struct frec *prev, *nxt = forward->dependent;
free_frec(forward);
while ((prev = nxt))
@ -2137,6 +2147,15 @@ static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct dns_header *header, si
!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_IGN_NS) && (server->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC),
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_ABANDONED))
{
/* Log the actual validation that made us barf. */
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (extract_name(header, n, &p, daemon->namebuff, 0, 4) == 1)
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("validation of %s failed: resource limit exceeded."),
daemon->namebuff[0] ? daemon->namebuff : ".");
}
if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_NEED_DS) && !STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_NEED_KEY))
break;